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Abstract
Two studies examine the interaction of political conservatism and need for cognitive closure in predicting aggressiveness toward out-groups. In the first study, Polish participants indicate their preference for conflict resolution strategies in the context of a real-life conflict between in-group (Poles) and out-group (Germans). Only among participants who identify themselves as conservatives need for cognitive closure is significantly related to preference for aggressive actions against the out-group. In the second study, the predicted interaction was investigated in the context of the terrorist threat in Poland. The findings indicate that high in need for closure conservatives support aggression against Arabs and Muslims only when they believe their in-group is threatened by possible terrorist attacks inspired by Islamic fundamentalism. 
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Political conservatism serves a number of psychological needs (e.g. system justification or social dominance; Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser & Sulloway, 2003) and is more likely than any other set of political beliefs to satisfy the psychological need to avoid cognitively complex or ambiguous environments i.e. need for cognitive closure (Jost, et al, 2003; see also Chirumbolo, 2002; Golec, 2001, 2002a, 2002b; Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999; Kemmelmeier, 1997; Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003). A conservative worldview contains a promise of a predictable social order with minimal complexity and minimal risk of change. Conservative worldview also seems to imply a biased understanding of inter-group relations that is likely to inspire preference for tough and hostile actions against out-groups in inter-group conflicts. For example, conservatives tend to see international powers as belligerent, dishonest, and expansionist (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990) and favor aggressive and hawkish ways of dealing with them, particularly when they are seen as immediate threats (Holsti, 1996; Wittkopf, 1990). There is also a well established relationship between political conservatism and the tendency to use coercion in political life (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990; Holsti, 1996, McCann, 2008). Thus, it is likely that conservatives who are motivated to adhere to behavioral prescriptions embedded in their worldviews may see no other option than fight and coercion in inter-group situations that are interpreted as conflictual or threatening their in-group. 
Need for cognitive closure can be described as the motivation to quickly formulate and maintain a clear opinion on an issue, rather than accepting confusion and ambiguity (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). This trait is related to a tendency to rely on ideological cues and group norms in inter-group behavior (e.g. Golec de Zavala, 2006; Ho-ying Fu et al., 2007). Furthermore, high need for closure is related to a decreased ability to understand inter-group situations in complex and multifaceted ways (De Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999; De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000; Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996). Limited cognitive perspective and simplistic perception are, in turn, related to preference for coercive actions in inter-group conflicts (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1982; Deutsch, 1973; Golec, 2002b; Golec de Zavala, 2006; Sheriff, 1958; Suedfeld & Tetlock 1977; Winter, 2007). Thus, high need for closure predisposes people to see inter-group relations in a “black and white” way that encourages competition. The predisposition to compete is strengthened by the tendency to adhere to behavioral prescriptions provided by salient belligerent worldviews that is characteristic for the high need for closure. 
It has been demonstrated that the relationship between high need for closure and inter-group aggressiveness is strengthened by salience of competitive cultural conflict resolution styles (Ho-ying Fu et al., 2007), political extremism and hawkishness (Golec & Federico, 2004), nationalism (Federico, Golec & Dial, 2005) and salient, situational competitive cues (Golec de Zavala, Federico, Cislak & Sigger, 2008) Surprisingly, no studies have examined the role of conservative political orientation as a moderator of preferences for coercive actions in inter-group context among people motivated by a high need for closure (cf. Golec de Zavala, 2006). In the studies presented in this paper we investigate these hypotheses in the context of an open international conflict (study 1) and in the context of a situation that might possibly be perceived in terms of an inter-group conflict. That is, we use the context of terrorist threat in Poland, a country that has never been a target of terrorist attacks (study 2). However, before presenting the hypotheses in detail we discuss the relationship between need for cognitive closure, chronically salient worldviews and inter-group behavior.
Need for closure and conflict behavior
Need for cognitive closure  is related to negative inter-group attitudes and belligerent inter-group actions. People high in need for closure tend to favor the in-group and disfavor out-groups more strongly (Shah, Kruglanski, Thompson, 1998). Negotiators high in the need for closure engage in less systematic information processing that results in greater competitiveness towards opponents stereotyped as competitive (De Dreu, Koole, Oldersma, 1999). In inter-group conflicts, people high in need for closure tend to choose actions that escalate, rather than appease the conflict, especially when salient ideologies or group norms prescribe aggressive behaviors towards out-groups (Federico, Golec & Dial, 2005; Golec de Zavala, 2006; Golec & Federico, 2004; Golec de Zavala et al., 2008). 
People high in the need for closure tend to adhere to group norms regulating inter-group behavior (Golec & Federico, 2004; Ho-ying Fu, et al., 2007; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006). Thus, high need for cognitive closure is related to inter-group aggressiveness when salient ideologies or cues indicate that aggression is most desirable behavior or unrelated to coercion when group norms or beliefs provide rules of cooperation or simply do not support aggression (Golec de Zavala, 2006; Ho-ying Fu, et al., 2007) or when cooperation is primed by situational cues (Golec de Zavala, et al., 2008). Thus, the relationship between need for closure and inter-group aggressiveness depends on what ideological context is salient and available. In present studies we examine how this relationship is moderated by the political ideology people high in need for closure often opt for i.e. political conservatism. 
Political conservatism and cognitive uncertainty
Numerous studies indicate that psychological needs motivate adoption of political ideologies and attitudes (Duckitt, 2001, Jost, et al., 2003). Although, what is understood as conservative differs across the geographic locations and socio-political contexts, the function of conservative ideology seems to remain the same: opposition to social change and preference for social hierarchy (Jost, et al., 2003). It has been suggested that conservative worldview provides epistemic protection from cognitive uncertainty and personal and social threat (Jost , Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai,, Ostafin, 2007). A recent study demonstrates also that worldviews (such as conservatism) that define values as stable and absolute rather than relative and truth as definite rather than discursive and approximate attract people motivated to avoid cognitive uncertainty (Golec de Zavala & van Bergh, 2007).
A seminal review by Jost et al. (2003), demonstrates a remarkably reliable relationship between high need for cognitive closure (and associated variables such as intolerance of ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, low cognitive complexity and close-mindedness) and support for core conservative political beliefs (Jost et al. 2003). Studies show that higher level of need for closure are associated with conservative political attitudes (Chirumbolo, Areni, Sensales, 2004; Van Hiel, Pandelaere, Duriez, 2004); right-wing party identification (Kemmelmeier, 1997); favorable attitude toward death penalty (Jost, Kruglanski & Simon, 1999); stronger anti-immigrant and nationalistic attitudes (Chirumbolo et al., 2004) and general punitiveness (Sargent, 2004). These relationships are found among ordinary citizens as well as political elites (Kemmelmeier, 2007). Thus, a conservative worldview is likely to be chronically salient for people high in need for closure and they may use it to guide their actions in inter-group situations. 
Political conservatism and inter-group behavior
As mentioned above, conservative political ideology contains quite clear prescriptions for desirable ways of dealing with inter-group situations such as inter-group conflict and threat to the in-group. There is substantial empirical evidence indicating the relationship between political conservatism and preference for out-group coercion and aggression (Hurwitz, Peffley, 1990; Holsti, 1996; Wittkopf, 1990). Conservatives tend to endorse a “militant internationalist” approach to foreign affairs, which favors the aggressive use of military force to achieve desired foreign policy goals; while rejecting a “cooperative internationalist” approach, which emphasizes collaborative, multilateral engagement with other nations and with an international organization in the resolution of international disputes and problems (see Holsti, 1996). 
In addition, conservatives seem to become more aggressive when they feel threatened either personally or as group members. Conservatives confronted with their own mortality become more intolerant toward those who threaten their worldview (Greenberg, Simon, Solomon, Chatel, Pyszczynski, 1992), tend to derogate anti-US individuals (Arndt, Greenberg, 1999) and support US military attacks that could lead to death of thousands of civilians (Pyszczynski, Abdollahi, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen & Weise, 2006). Conservative Israelis who opposed the Israeli pullout plan form Gaza Strip when threatened with own mortality supported violent rejection to this plan and were more acceptant of violent and aggressive actions (Hirschberg & Ein-Dor, 2006). Among the 9/11 survivors, the conservative shift in political views was associated with increased support for militarism, and for the US taking military actions in Afghanistan (Bonanno & Jost, 2006). Political conservatism under threat is also related to the preference for punitiveness towards those who threaten existing social order (McCann, 2008). 
Thus, conservative political ideology is associated with preference for aggressive ways of dealing with threatening social groups. We argue that in inter-group conflict and in the context of perceived threat to the in-group, political conservatism supplies guidance and justification for the competitive and hostile actions against threatening out-groups. Liberal worldview, on the other hand, is less likely to provide a ready made behavioral prescription to be applied to all situations defined as threat or a conflict. Liberals are more responsive to unique, altering aspects of social situations (e.g Amodio, Jost, Master, Yee, 2007). They are also less likely to choose one-sided and hostile inter-group actions. Studies show that people who endorse liberal worldview tend to be more egalitarian, less punitive, less willing to fight a war than people who identify with conservative worldview (Basabe & Valencia, 2007). Thus, chronically accessible conservative worldview that provides clear cues for aggressive behavior in conflict is likely to strengthen the relationship between high need for closure and aggressiveness while accessibility of liberal worldview that does not encourage ready-made solution for all conflictual situations is not likely to enhance it.
Thus, we assume that the relationship between need for closure and aggressiveness will be positive and significant only among people who describe themselves as conservative but not among those who identify themselves as liberal. We examine this assumption in the context of an open inter-group conflict (study 1) and controlling for perception of the inter-group situation as threatening to the in-group (study 2). 
STUDY 1
In study 1 we test the hypothesis that the relationship between need for cognitive closure and aggressiveness in the inter-group conflict is moderated by support for conservative worldview. We predict that people high in need for closure will prefer aggressive actions in conflict only when they define their political outlook as conservative. We examine the relationships in the context of the international conflict between Poland and Germany. This conflict was salient when the study was conducted. 
Method
Participants. The respondents were 120 undergraduate students (92 women, 25 men, 3 persons failed to indicate their gender) at a major university in Southern Poland. Participants were ranging in age from 20 to 44, M = 25 years.  
Procedure. This study on conflictual intergroup relations was conducted during a time of an actual political conflict between Poland and Germany. The issue at stake concerned a memorial for German exiles from Poland in the context of World War II. Participants were asked to complete the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale and describe their political orientation using the Self Placement Scale. In the following, they were asked to read a short description of the conflict between Poland and Germany and then had to evaluate how likely they were to choose a series of 8 aggressive actions toward the German out-group. 
Conflict. As a result of agreements reached at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences near the end of WWII, lands that had formerly belonged to the eastern region of pre-war Germany became part of Poland. As a consequence, Germans living in this regions were expelled and forced to move west. Representatives of these exiles and their descendants proposed to build a monument in Poland commemorating the victims of the this settlement action. However, many Poles were displeased with the idea of Germans being commemorated as victims of WWII. The discontentment is based on the fact that Germany was the nation that started the war by invading Poland on September 1, 1939. Polish government responded with a call for stronger efforts to enforce German payment of long-overdue war reparations to Poland. Germans, on the other hand, called for the return of German lands and indemnification against WWII-era Polish compensation claims.
Measurements. 
Need for Cognitive Closure. This variable was measured using a Polish version of the 42-item Need for Closure Scale successfully used in earlier studies (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Golec, 2001; Golec & Federico, 2004) (α=.82; M = 3.54; SD = .42). Participants responded using a scale from ‘1’ – ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘6’ – ‘strongly agree’. Higher scores indicate higher levels of need for cognitive closure.
Political Self-placement Scale. To assess participants’ self-reported political orientation, they were asked to place themselves on a 7-point Likert scale where ‘1’ was defined as ‘definitely liberal’ and ‘7’ was defined as ‘definitely conservative’. (M = 2.77; SD = .82).
Aggressive actions in conflict. Respondents were asked to read the description of the Polish-German conflict. Afterwards they were asked to indicate on the 7-point Likert scales the likelihood of choosing certain strategy to resolve the conflict (‘1’ – ‘highly unlikely’ to ‘7’ – ‘highly likely’), if they were themselves in the position to make the decision. The 8 strategies were adopted from the Conflict Resolution Strategies Questionnaire (Golec de Zavala, 2005; Golec & Federico, 2004) and included (1) “use of fraud and deception”; (2) “spread negative information about the opponent”; (3) “reject all of proposals”; (4) “act as if you are never giving in”; (5) “criticize”; (6) “demonstrate your strength in order to intimidate”; (7) “humiliate and disregard” and (8) “openly attack” Higher scores indicate higher levels of acceptance of each strategy (α=. 83; M = 2.28; SD = .99).  
Results 
Correlation analyses were conducted to test the relationship between political conservatism, need for cognitive closure, and preference for aggressive actions in the Polish-German conflict. In tendency, though non-significantly so, need for cognitive closure is positively correlated with aggressiveness (Table I). This result is marginally significant (p < .065) 
INSERT TABLE I HERE
The relationship between need for closure and aggressiveness among political conservatives. To test our main hypothesis we estimated a series of hierarchical regression models with the participant’s preference for aggressive actions in the Polish – German conflict as the dependent variable. Need for cognitive closure and conservative-liberal self placement were entered in the first model. The second model also included the interaction terms. Three demographic variables are included in the analyses: (1) age in years, (2) gender, and the number of (3) years of University education. The results reveal that none of the demographics is significantly related to the participants’ preference for aggressive actions in conflict (Table II). Model 1 shows that participant’s identification with conservative ideology is significantly related to the stronger preference for aggressive actions. However, the relationship between aggressiveness and the need for closure is not significant (p < .25). Model 2 shows a significant positive relationship between aggressiveness and political conservatism and marginally significant positive relationship of aggressiveness with need for cognitive closure (p < .10). These effects are qualified by a significant interaction of need for closure and conservatism (p < .01). 
INSERT TABLE II HERE
This interaction was further analyzed using the procedure proposed by Aiken & West (1991). This analysis indicates that the relationship between need for closure and preference for aggressive actions in conflict is significant among participants who score high on the Liberal-Conservative Self-Placement scale (b = .62; SD = .22; p < .007), but not among those who define their political orientation as liberal rather than conservative (b = .14; SD = .18; p < .45). This interaction is illustrated by Figure 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
DISCUSSION OF STUDY 1
The results of Study 1 confirm the moderating role of political conservatism in the relationship between need for cognitive closure and aggressiveness in the inter-group conflict. Need for cognitive closure is related to preference for aggressive actions against the out-group in the conflict but only among people who identify their political outlook as conservative rather than liberal. These relationships were examined in the context of an ongoing international conflict between Poland and Germany and it is assumed that participants were well aware of the political tensions between both countries. Similarly, previous research investigated the relationship between need for closure and aggressiveness in open inter-group conflicts (Golec & Federico, 2004). 
However, these studies did not examine further the effect of high need for closure and conservative worldview in predisposing people to choose aggression when the inter-group situation is defined as conflict or they predispose people to see most inter-group situations as threatening the in-group, conflictual and in need of aggressive responses. Generally, conservatives tend to be more collectivistic, they tend to think in terms of their group loyalties, and highly value their social identities. In addition, political conservatism is related to national group attachment in form of both patriotism and nationalism (Adorno et al, 1950; Karasawa, 2002; Starnawski, 2003). Authoritarianism and political conservatism are related to a tendency to endorse communal values and belong to social groups and organizations (Skarzynska & Gientka, 1999). Authoritarianism (related to conservatism) is related to collectivism (Kemmelmeier, et al, 2003) and is an opposition of individualism (Gelfand, Triandis, Chan, 1996). Thus, conservatives may be more likely to perceive world in terms of social divisions and be more sensitive to possible threats to in-group than liberals. 
Therefore, conservative worldview may predispose people to interpret ambiguous inter group situations as conflicts, act aggressively and in fact turn them into conflicts. Alternatively, the behavioral prescriptions may be activated only when the situation has been already defined as threat and a conflict. In the first case, the perception of a situation as threatening to the in-group is predicted to mediate the relationship between the interaction of high need for closure and conservatism and aggressiveness. In the second case the interaction between high need for closure and conservatism would be significant only among people who perceive inter-group situation as conflictual and threatening the in-group. In other words, we predict a three way interaction between need for closure, political ideology and perception of threat to the in-group. That is, the tendency to perceive inter-group situations as conflictual may either mediate or moderate the relationship between need for closure, political conservatism and aggressiveness.
Study 2 investigated the relationships between need for cognitive closure, political conservatism and aggressiveness in an inter-group situation which might possibly be perceived as threatening to the in-group. Specifically, the Polish participants were reminded of terrorist attacks in the US, UK and Spain. Subsequently, they were asked to estimate the extent to which their nation is in danger of attacks from terrorist organizations inspired by Islam and then to indicate their preference for taking certain actions towards Arabs and Muslims. 
STUDY 2
A possible terrorist threat  to Poland and Polish citizens provided the context of Study 2. In this scenario, it was emphasized that despite its involvement in the War on Terrorism following the 9/11 attacks, Poland itself did not suffer from terrorism. Poles vary in their perceptions of the possibility of terrorist attacks in Poland and in the level of threat of such attacks. In early 2006, when the study was conducted, the opinion pools revealed that about 61% of Poles believed that Poland may be targeted by terrorist organizations because of Polish involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, while 29% of Polish respondents believed that there would not be a terrorist threat to Poland (CBOS, 2007). Based on these finding, we predicted  that participants who fear a terrorist attack are more likely to perceive the situation in terms of an inter-group conflict.
Method
Participants. Participants were 187 undergraduate students at major university in Northern Poland. Their age ranged from 19 to 35 years (M = 23; SD = 2). 16 men and 171 women took part in the study and were asked to fill in the questionnaire in exchange to the research participation credit.
Measurements. 
Need for Cognitive Closure. This variable was measured using the Polish version of the Need for Closure Scale as in study 1 (α=. 73; M = 3.60; SD = .39).  
Political Self-placement Scale. To assess self-ascribed political affiliation, participants were asked to place themselves on a 7-point Likert scale where ‘1’ was defined as ‘definitely liberal’ and ‘7’ was defined as ‘definitely conservative’. (M = 3.41; SD = 1.31).
 	Fear of terrorist attacks against Poland. In this study participants were asked to respond to a question “How much are you afraid terrorist attack in Poland?” on a scale from ‘1’ – ‘Not at all’ to ‘7’- ‘Very much’.  (M = 3.61; SD = 1.75).
Anti-Arab and anti Muslim aggressiveness. This index was based on four items that allegedly reflected opinions of other university students. Participants were asked to express their support for following statements “Student C thinks that the ‘War on Terrorism’ should be transformed into a war against the Arab culture because it is a source of intolerance, violence and hostility against Western values”, “Student D thinks that European culture is superior to all other cultures”, “Student I considers Islamic culture as being equal in value to Western culture and equally respectful” (reversely coded) and “Student J thinks that the wars on Afghanistan and war on Iraq were the best way to deter terrorists and show who is more powerful” (α=.74; M = 2.43; SD = 1.08). Participants were asked to indicate how much they support each opinion using scale from ‘1’- ‘Strongly disagree’  to ‘7’ – ‘Strongly agree’.
Results
We first analyzed inter-correlations between the variables as depicted in Table III. The results reveal that both political conservatism and high need for closure are positively related to the threat perception and to aggressiveness toward Muslims and Arabs. 
INSERT TABLE III HERE
The relationship between need for closure, political conservatism and inter-group aggressiveness as a function of perceived threat to the in-group
In order to test the two competing hypotheses regarding the process underlying the relationship between high need for closure, political conservatism and aggressiveness we used the method proposed by Muller, Judd & Yzerbyt (2005).We tested the mediated moderation hypothesis that high in need for closure conservatives are more likely to see threat in inter-group situations and therefore more frequently choosing aggressive responses more often using. We found that perceived terrorist threat to Poland did not mediate the relationship between the interaction of need for closure and conservatism and anti Arab and anti Muslim hostility. 
In the next step we tested the hypothesis that among those participants who see terrorist threat to Poland chronic accessibility of conservative worldview moderates the relationship between high need for closure and hostility. To test this hypothesis we estimated a series of hierarchical ordinary least-squares regression models on standardized predictors with the support for the anti-Arab aggressiveness as the dependent variable. Threat to the in-group, need for cognitive closure and political conservatism (controlled for age and gender) were entered as predictors in the first model, the second model also included 3 two-way interactions: need for closure x conservatism; need for closure x threat; threat x conservatism, and finally the third model included also a three-way interaction of all the main predictors (Table IV). 
INSERT TABLE IV HERE
As evidenced by the estimates for the Model 1, both perceived terrorist threat to Poland (b = .27; p = .001) and respondent’s support for conservative ideology (b = .18; p < .05) were positively and significantly related to Anti-Arab aggressiveness. Neither the relationship between the need for closure and aggressiveness nor any of the two-way interactions were significant, (respectively b = .05; p > .1; b = .15; p > .1; b = -.01; p > .1; b = -.01; p > .1). However, the regression coefficient for the three way interaction between perceived threat, conservatism and need for closure introduced in Model 3 proved to be significant  (b = .17; p < .05). This interaction is illustrated in Figure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
DISCUSSION OF STUDY 2
In Study 2 we replicated and extended the findings of study 1 in a significant way. The results confirm the moderating role of political orientation for the relationship between need for closure and inter-group aggressiveness. Need for closure was related to out-group hostility among participants who identified themselves as conservatives rather than liberals. Most importantly, this interaction was significant only among those participants who perceived the Islamist terrorism as threat to their in-group. In other words, only those high in need for closure conservatives who believed that Poland is threatened by terrorism inspired by Islam expressed Western ethnocentrism and preference for aggressive actions towards Muslims and Arabs. Thus, in an inter-group situation that is not clearly defined as inter-group conflict need for closure and political conservatism are related to aggressiveness only among those participants who tend to perceive the situation as conflictual and believe that their in-group is threatened.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of the present studies indicate that conservative political outlook inspires coercive and aggressive behavior but only when the inter-group situation is portrayed or perceived as threat to the in-group or an inter-group conflict. This effect is also restricted to people who are motivated to avoid cognitive uncertainty and are likely to use ideological cues to guide their inter-group actions. The results confirm also that the need for cognitive closure is an important predictor of inter-group behavior but its relationship with inter-group aggressiveness is complex rather than straightforward (see also Chirumbolo, et al, 2004; Golec de Zavala, 2006; Golec & Federico, 2004; Golec de Zavala et al, 2008; Ho-ying Fu, et al., 2007; Shah et al, 1998). Competitive cues embedded in a chronically salient conservative worldview strengthen the relationship between high need for closure and hostility in the inter-group context. Among self-defined liberals, the relationship between high need for closure and inter-group aggressiveness is not significant. 
It has been suggested that people high in need for closure choose coercive actions in inter-group conflict because they favor simple and final solutions to complex situations. Within a limited cognitive perspective aggression and coercion bring an illusion of simplicity and finality because they aim at permanently silencing the opponent (Golec & Federico, 2004). High need for closure also motivates people to protect their in-groups since social groups are important providers of epistemic certainty (Kruglanski et al, 2006). However, people high in need for closure report preference for aggressive actions only when the ideological cues (e.g. shared beliefs, norms and worldviews) suggest aggression as the most proper and desirable way of dealing with in-group threat and inter-group conflict. The present studies show that political conservatism is a source of competitive cues people high in need for closure are likely to follow in inter-group conflict. 
Furthermore, our findings suggest that conservative worldview contains a confrontational ‘conflict schema’ (Bar-Tal, Kruglanski & Klar, 1993; see also Federico, Golec & Dial, 2005; Golec & Federico, 2004) that suggests aggression and coercion as proper reactions as soon as a social situation is defined as an inter-group conflict. On the other hand, liberal political outlook may be related to a cooperative conflict schema. As mentioned above, a liberal worldview is related to egalitarianism, support for civic rights and liberties and rejection of war (Basabe & Valencia, 2007; McFarland & Mathews, 2005). However, it may also be likely that whereas political conservatism contains clear, general prescriptions for actions in inter-group conflicts, liberal worldview is related to greater responsiveness to situational particularities and lesser tendency to rely on ‘ready made’ solutions to all conflict situations. Conservatives tend to have rigid and persistent cognitive style (Crowson, 2008; Jost et al., 2003) and rely on cognitive heuristics such as conflict schemas in order to understand and choose behavior in all situations classified as conflicts. On the other hand, liberals are more responsive to altering aspects of situations and less likely to have one dominant conflict schema (e.g Amodio et al., 2007). In other words, liberals may be more likely than conservatives to analyze all inter-group conflicts in a ‘bottom up’ mode rather than to apply a conflict schema to each particular conflict situation in a ‘top down’ mode. Thus, it may be sufficient that liberals do not have a crystallized opinion on how to act in conflicts or they are chronically suspicious towards one best way of seeing social situations to diminish the relationship between high need for closure and aggressiveness.
Importantly, the present studies indicate that a necessary condition for the interactive effect of high need for closure and political conservatism to reveal is that people have to define the inter-group situation as conflictual and threatening to the in-group. In Study 1 participants were reminded about a real and currently ongoing inter-group conflict. The results of this study reveal that conservatives high in need for closure tend to choose aggressive and coercive strategies in order to deal with this conflict. In study 2, we presented participants with a situation that may be defined as conflictual but does not have to be, as we asked participants to what extent they feel Poland may be targeted by terrorist organizations. 
Terrorist threat does not have to be perceived as an element of an inter-group situation. It may be seen as an unpredictable, natural disaster (Sinclair, LoCicero, 2006). In addition, even if Polish participants see the War on Terror as an inter-group situation, they do not have to fear terrorist attacks in Poland. Poland has never suffered from terrorist attacks or serious terrorist threat. Thus, such a scenario does not directly activate in-group threat. As a consequence, aggression and counterattacks  might not be automatically triggered default reactions, even if a situation is defined as an inter-group conflict involving one’s in-group.  An inter-group conflict can be perceived as a chance to develop, reformulate and strengthen inter-group relations in a way that makes the coexistence better for all involved parties (e.g. Deutsch, 1973). A conflict may offer a chance of developing a new ways of dealing with similar problems in future, a chance to increase not just to divide ‘the pie’ (De Dreu, Koole, Steinel, 2000). The results of Study 2 revealed that only among Polish participants who perceived a realistic terrorist threat to Poland, the interaction of high need for closure and political conservatism predicted the support for transforming the War of Terrorism into a war against the whole Arab world and the belief that war is the way of dealing with Islamic culture that is essentially inferior to Western culture. Thus, high need for closure and political conservatism increase the chance of choosing aggression in response to in-group threat. The three factors - cognitive rigidity, political conservatism and threat to perceived in-group - have to be present to predict preference for inter-group aggression. 
The present results reveal a coherent pattern of relationships between need for closure, political conservatism and inter-group aggressiveness and we would like to acknowledge that the mechanism that we suggest in our analyses is causal. Though the correlational nature of our data does not allow us to draw firm conclusions about the causal relationships. Earlier analyses suggest that broad ideological orientations and worldviews (nationalism or conservatism) constrain specific attitudes (preferences for inter-group behavior) (Golec, Federico, 2004). Nevertheless, future research should investigate these issues further in a series of experimental designs. Another caveat of the present study is the fact that both studies used convenience samples comprised of students. This might limit generalizability of our findings (see Sears, 1986). However, we suppose that among different samples, especially those to whom political cues are chronically salient (like politicians), the relationship we describe would only be more pronounced, and that in general political sophistication and involvement of political elites (e.g. greater exposure to and understanding of political ideology) would strengthen the relationships between cognitive functioning, political conservatism, and aggression toward out-groups. 


References
Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., and Sanford, R. N. (1950). The Authoritarian Personality. New York, Harper & Brothers.
Aiken, L. S., West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Amodio, D.M., Jost, J. T., Master, S.L., Yee, C.M. (2007). Neurocognitive correlates of liberalism and conservatism. Nature Neuroscience, 10, 1246 – 1247. 
Arndt, J., Greenberg, J. (1999). The Effects of a Self-Esteem Boost and Mortality Salience on Responses to Boost Relevant and Irrelevant Worldview Threats. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1331-1341.
Bar-Tal, D., Kruglanski, A.W., Klar, Y. (1989). Conflict termination: An epistemological analysis of 
international cases. Political Psychology, 10, 233-255. 
Basabe, N., Valencia, J. (2007). Culture of peace: Sociostructural dimensions, cultural values, and emotional climate. Journal of Social Issues, 63, 405-419. 
Bonanno, G.A., Jost, J.T. (2006). Conservative shift among high-exposure survivors of the September 11th terrorist attacks. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 28, 311-323.
CBOS. (2007). Term of Polish troops withdrawal from Iraq, attitudes toward building US anti-rocket defense system in Poland and terrorism-anxiety.[O terminie wycofania żołnierzy polskich z Iraku, stosunku do ulokowania w Polsce elementów tarczy antyrakietowej i obawach przed terroryzmem]. www.cbos.pl, accessed on Oct. 2008.
Chirumbolo, A. (2002). The relationship between need for cognitive closure and political orientation: The mediating role of authoritarianism. Personality and Individual Differences, 32, 603–610.
Chirumbolo, A., Areni, A., Sensales, G. (2004). Need for cognitive closure and politics: Voting, political attitudes, and attributional style. International Journal of Psychology, 39, 245-253.
Crowson, M.H.(2008, July). Cultural and economic conservatism: Relationships with epistemic beliefs and motives, death anxiety, and dogmatic aggression. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Paris, France.
Deutsch, M. (1973). The resolution of conflict: constructive and destructive process. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
De Dreu, C., Koole, S.L., Oldersma, F.L. (1999). On the seizing and freezing of negotiator 
inferences: Need for cognitive closure moderates the use of heuristics in negotiation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 348-362.
De Dreu, C., Koole, S.L., Steinel, W. (2000). Unfixing the fixed pie: A motivated information-
processing approach to integrative negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 975-987.
Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 33, pp. 41–112). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Federico, C., Golec, A., & Dial, J. (2005). The relationship between need for closure and support for 
military action against Iraq: Moderating effects of national attachment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 621-632.
Gelfand, M. J., Triandis, H. C. & Chan, K. S. (1996). Individualism versus collectivism or versus authoritarianism? European Journal of Social Psychology, 26, 397-410.
Golec A. (2001). Konserwatyzm polityczny i potrzeba poznawczego domkniecia w badaniach polskich. (Political conservatism and the need for cognitive closure in Polish studies), Studia Psychologiczn, (Psychological Studies), 39, 423-58. 
Golec (2002a). Need for cognitive closure and political conservatism: studies on the nature of the relationship. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 33, 5-12.
Golec A. (2002b) Cognitive skills as a predictor of attitudes toward political conflict: A study of Polish politicians. Political Psychology, 23, 731-757.
Golec de Zavala, A. (2005). National attitudes and reactions to conflict: exploration of the role of differences in cognitive functioning. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 36, 213-223.
Golec de Zavala, A. (2006). Cognitive and motivational factors underlying individual responses to 
political conflicts. In A. Golec de Zavala & K. Skarzynska (Ed.), Understanding social change: political psychology in Poland. NY Hauppauge: NOVA Publisher Ldt. 
Golec, A., Federico, C. M. (2004). Understanding responses to political conflict: Interactive effects of 
the need for closure and salient conflict schemas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 750-762.
Golec de Zavala, A., Federico, C., Cislak, A., Sigger, J. (2008). Need for Closure and Conflict-Strategy Preferences: Experimental Evidence for the Moderating Effect of Salient Conflict Schemas. European Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 84-105.
Golec de Zavala, A., van Bergh, A. (2007). Need for Cognitive Closure and conservative political beliefs: Differential mediation by personal worldviews. Political Psychology, 28, 587-608.
Greenberg, J., Simon, L., Solomon, S., Chatel, D., Pyszczynski, T. (1992). Terror management and tolerance: does mortality salience always intensify negative reactions to others who threaten one's worldview? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 212-220.
Hirschberg, G., Ein-Dor, T. (2006). Defenders of a Lost Cause: Terror Management and Violent Resistance to the Disengagement Plan. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 761-769.
Holsti, O. R. (1996). Public opinion and American foreign policy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Ho-ying Fu, J., Morris, M. W., Sau-lai, L., Chao, M., Chi-yue, C., Ying-yi, H. (2007). Epistemic Motives and Cultural Conformity: Need for Closure, Culture, and Context as Determinants of Conflict Judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 191-207.
Hurwitz, J., & Peffley, M. (1990). Public images of the Soviet Union: The impact on foreign policy attitudes. Journal of Politics, 52, 3–28.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., Sulloway, F. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated 
social cognition.  Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339-375.
Jost, J. T., Kruglanski, A. W., Simon, L. (1999). Effects of epistemic motivation on conservatism, intolerance, and other system justifying attitudes. In L. Thompson, D. M. Messick, & J. M. Levine (Eds.), Shared cognition in organizations: The management of knowledge (pp. 	91–116). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Jost, J., Napier, J., Thorisdottir, H., Gosling, S, D., Palfai, T. P., Ostafin, B. (2007). Are Needs to Manage Uncertainty and Threat Associated With Political Conservatism or Ideological Extremity? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 989-1007.
Karasawa, M. (2002). Patriotism, nationalism, and internationalism among Japanese citizens:
	An etic-emic approach. Political Psychology, 23, 645-666.
Kemmelmeier, M. (1997). Need for closure and political orientation among German university students. Journal of Social Psychology, 137, 787–789. 
Kemmelmeier, M., Burnstein, E., Krumov, K., Genkova, P., Kanagawa, C., Hirshberg, M.S., Erb, H.P., Wieczorkowska, G., Noels, K.A. (2003). Individualism, Collectivism, and Authoritarianism in Seven Societies. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 34, 304-322.
Kossowska, M. & Van Hiel, A. (2003). The Relationship Between Need for Closure and Conservative Beliefs in Western and Eastern Europe. Political Psychology, 24, 501-518.
Kruglanski, A.W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L. & DeGrada, E. (2006). Groups as epistemic providers: Need for closure and the unfolding of group centrism. Psychological Review, 113, 84-100.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: “seizing” and “freezing”. 
Psychological Review, 103, 263-283.
McCann, S. J. H. (2008). Societal Threat, Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and U.S. State Death
Penalty Sentencing (1977–2004). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 913-923.
McFarland, S., Mathews, M. (2005). Who Cares About Human Rights? Political Psychology, 26, 365-385.
Muller, D., Judd C.M., & Yzerbyt, V.Y. (2005). When Moderation Is Mediated and Mediation Is Moderated. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 852-863.
Pruitt, D. G., & Carnevale, P. (1982). The development of integrative agreements. In: P. Derlega & J. 
Grzelak (Eds.) Cooperative and helping behavior: Theories and research (pp. 151-181). New York: Academic Press. 
Pyszczynski, T., Abdollahi, A., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Weise, D. (2006). Mortality Salience, Martyrdom, and Military Might: The Great Satan Versus the Axis of Evil. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 525-537.
Sargent, M. J. (2004). Less Thought, More Punishment: Need for Cognition Predicts Support for Punitive Responses to Crime. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 1485-1493.
Shah, J. Y., Kruglanski, A. W., & Thompson, E. P. (1998). Membership has its (epistemic) rewards: Need for closure effects on ingroup bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 383-393.
Sherif, M. (1958). Superordinate goals in the reduction of intergroup conflict. American Journal of Sociology, 63, 349-356.
Sinclair, S. & LoCicero, A. (2006). Development and psychometric testing of the perceptions of terrorism questionnaire short-form (PTQ-SF). New School Psychology Bulletin, 4, 7-37.
Suedfeld, P., Tetlock, P. (1977). Integrative complexity of communication in international crises. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21, 169-168.
Skarzynska, K., Gientka, J. (1999). Is Authoritarianism a form of collectivism? Authoritarianism, attitudes and behaviors [Czy autorytaryzm jest forma kolektywizmu? Autorytaryzm a postawy i zachowania spoleczne studentow]. Studia Psychologiczne, 37, 115-131. 
Starnawski, M. (2003). Nationalist discourse and the ultraconservative press in contemporary Poland: a case study of »Nasz Dziennik«”. Patterns of Prejudice, 37, 65-81.
Van Hiel, A., Pandelaere, M., Duriez, B., (2004). The Impact of Need for Closure on Conservative Beliefs and Racism: Differential Mediation by Authoritarian Submission and Authoritarian Dominance. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 824-837. 
Webster, D. M., Kruglanski, A.W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 1049-1062.
Webster, D.M., Richter, L., & Kruglanski, A.W. (1996). On leaping to conclusions when feeling tired: 
Mental fatigue effects on impression formation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 181-195.
Winter, D.G. (2007). The Role of Motivation, Responsibility, and Integrative Complexity in
Crisis Escalation: Comparative Studies of War and Peace Crises. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 920-937.
Wittkopf, E. R.(1990). Faces of internationalism: Public opinion and American foreign policy. Durham: Duke University Press.



Table I
Intercorrelations between need for closure, political conservatism and preferences for aggressive conflict actions: Study 1 (N = 120)

 	Political conservatism	Need for closure
Political conservatism		
Need for closure	.22*	
Aggressive actions	.30**	.17+
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).




Table II
Interactive Effects of the Need for Closure and Political Ideology on the Preference for Destructive Strategies of Conflict Resolution: : Study 1 (N = 120)
	Model 1		Model 2	
Predictor	B	SE b	B	SE b
Age	-.02	(.02)	-.03	(.02)
Gender	-.22	(.23)	-.20	(.23)
NFC	.28	(.24)	.39+	(.23)
Political Ideology	.35**	(.11)	.29**	(.11)
NFC x Political Ideology	--	--	.26**	(.10)
Constant	.99	(.95)	.83	(.92)
F (degrees of freedom)	3.59 (4, 105)**		4.38 (5, 104)*	
R2	.120		.174	
+p<.10. *p<.05. **p<.01. 




Table III
Inter-correlations between need for closure, conservatism, perceived threat to the in-group and anti-Arab intolerance and aggressiveness: Study 2 (N = 187).

 	1	2	3
1. Political conservatism			
2. NFC	.24**		
3. Fear of attacks against Poland	.21**	.28***	
4. Anti-Arab aggressiveness	.23**	 .16*	.30***
*** Correlation is significant at the .000 level.
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level.
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level 



Table IV
Interactive Effects of Perceived Threat, Need for Closure and Political Ideology on the Preference for Anti-Arab Aggressiveness: Study 2 (N = 187)
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Predictor	B	SE b	B	SE b	B	SE b
Perceived Threat	.27***	(.08)	.28***	(.08)	.26***	(.08)
NFC	.06	(.08)	.07	(.08)	.03	(.08)
Political Ideology	.18*	(.08)	.17*	(.08)	.14+	(.08)
NFC x Political Ideology	--	--	.15	(.09)	.14	(.09)
NFC x Perceived Threat	--	--	-.02	(.07)	-.04	(.08)
Perceived Threat x Political Ideology	--	--	-.01	(.08)	-.01	(.08)
Perceived Threat x NFC x Political Ideology	--	--	--	--	.18*	(.08)
Constant 	 2.43***	(.08)	2.40***	(.08)	2.42***	(.08)
F (df)	8.42 (3, 182)**		9.37 (3, 179)***		14.12 (1, 178)***	
R2	.12		.13		.16	
+p<.10. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 

Figure 1: Interaction between need for closure and political conservativeness in shaping the preference for aggressive actions in conflict: Study 1 (N = 120).




Figure 2: Interactive Effects of Perceived Threat, Need for Closure and Political Ideology on the Preference for Anti-Arab Aggressiveness: Study 2 (N = 187). 
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